2015 Session 3: Belief and Reasoning | Minds Online | An open access, online conference on topics in the philosophy and science of mind

Basing Is Conjuring

Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Section 1: The Basing Relation

So-Hyun sees a Chinese Crested dog, and she recalls that hairless dogs that look like that are typically Chinese Crested dogs. At the very same time, her friend Adede points at the dog and says “look at that Chinese Crested dog right there!” So-Hyun believes that the dog is a Chinese Crested.

So-Hyun has at least two independent reasons to believe that the dog is a Chinese Crested. Continue reading Basing Is Conjuring

The Revisability View of Belief

Grace Helton, University of Antwerp

[PDF of Grace Helton’s paper]

[Jump to Michael Bishop’s commentary]
[Jump to Neil Van Leeuwen’s commentary]
[Jump to Grace Helton’s reply to commentaries]

It is widely held that for some mental state to be a belief, it must be, in some sense or other, responsive to evidence (Adler, 2002; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Gendler, 2008; Shah & Velleman, 2005; Velleman, 2000; cf. Bayne & Pacherie, 2005; Bortolotti, 2011).¹ The claim that beliefs are in fact evidence-responsive is distinct from the normative claim that beliefs ought to respond to evidence. The descriptive claim says that if some mental state is Continue reading The Revisability View of Belief

Against Intellectualist Theories of Belief

Jack Marley-Payne, MIT

[PDF of Jack Marley-Payne’s paper]

[Jump to Keith Frankish’s commentary]
[Jump to Eric Schwitzgebel’s commentary]

Abstract

Belief has long been held to be connected with both speech and action. However, cases of conflicting behaviour show that only one of these connections can be constitutive. Intellectualism is the view that the connection between belief and speech (and also conscious judgement) is to be prioritized. And, therefore, subjects with conflicting behaviour believe what they say. A prima facie compelling motivation for the view is the claim that beliefs Continue reading Against Intellectualist Theories of Belief

What Reasoning Might Be

Markos Valaris, (University of New South Wales)

[PDF of Markos Valaris’s paper]

[Jump to Matthew Boyle’s commentary]
[Jump to Zoe Jenkin’s commentary]
[Jump to Chris Tucker’s commentary]
[Jump to Markos Valaris’s reply to commentaries]

Abstract

The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal-level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. Continue reading What Reasoning Might Be