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Category: 2015 Session 2: Perception and Consciousness
Session 2: Perception & Consciousness
The second session of the 2015 Minds Online Conference is on the themes of Perception and Consciousness, featuring a keynote talk from Nico Orlandi (UC Santa Cruz), and contributed papers from Derek Brown (Brandon University), Jonathan Farrell (Manchester), E.J. Green (Rutgers University), and Assaf Weksler (Open University of Israel and Ben Gurion University).
This session is open for discussion from September 7 – 11.
There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of Bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models – or ‘predictive coding models’ – are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process (Clark 2012, Gladzeijewski 2015, Hohwy 2013, Rescorla 2013, Rescorla forthcoming.)
Colour Relationalism asserts that colours are non-intrinsic or inherently relational properties of objects, properties that depend not only on a target object but in addition on some relation(s) that object bears to other objects. The most powerful argument for Relationalism (Cohen 2009) infers the inherently relational character of colour from cases in which one’s experience of a colour contextually depends on one’s experience of other colours. Experienced colour layering – say looking at grass through a tinted window and experiencing opaque green through transparent grey – demands a contextual interdependency of one’s experience of one of these colours on one’s experience of the other. However, most if not all colour ontologies, and core perceptual experiential mechanisms like acquaintance and representation, can accommodate colour layering. It follows that Continue reading Colour layering and colour relationalism
Philosophers commonly talk about phenomenal consciousness by engaging in ‘what it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’ for short): they use sentences (‘WIL-sentences’) involving phrases such as ‘what is it like’ and ‘something it is like’. But it is not obvious what we mean when we engage in WIL-talk, or how we mean whatever it is we mean: how, by putting these words in this order do we come to talk about consciousness? Indeed some have argued that when philosophers engage in WIL-talk they are talking nonsense (Hacker 2002), or saying something false or trivial (Snowdon 2010). One popular account of WIL-talk is that it involves technical terms—special terms which, although they look and sound like Continue reading ‘What it is like’ talk is not technical talk
Imagine that you are meeting a friend for coffee, and you see her walking toward your table. As she walks, her arms and legs turn about their joints. Moreover, her forearms turn slightly about her elbows, and her tibias move about her knees. I suggest that, despite these changes, her overallstructure seems to Continue reading Structure Constancy