An open access, online conference on topics in the philosophy and science of mind
Category: 2015 Session 3: Belief and Reasoning
Session 3: Belief & Reasoning
The third session of the 2015 Minds Online Conference is on the themes of Belief and Reasoning, featuring a keynote talk from Ram Neta (UNC), and contributed papers from Grace Helton (University of Antwerp), Jack Marley-Payne (MIT), and Markos Valaris (University of New South Wales).
This session is open for discussion from September 14-18.
So-Hyun sees a Chinese Crested dog, and she recalls that hairless dogs that look like that are typically Chinese Crested dogs. At the very same time, her friend Adede points at the dog and says “look at that Chinese Crested dog right there!” So-Hyun believes that the dog is a Chinese Crested.
It is widely held that for some mental state to be a belief, it must be, in some sense or other, responsive to evidence (Adler, 2002; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Gendler, 2008; Shah & Velleman, 2005; Velleman, 2000; cf. Bayne & Pacherie, 2005; Bortolotti, 2011).1 The claim that beliefs are in fact evidence-responsive is distinct from the normative claim that beliefs ought to respond to evidence. The descriptive claim says that if some mental state is Continue reading The Revisability View of Belief
Belief has long been held to be connected with both speech and action. However, cases of conflicting behaviour show that only one of these connections can be constitutive. Intellectualism is the view that the connection between belief and speech (and also conscious judgement) is to be prioritized. And, therefore, subjects with conflicting behaviour believe what they say. A prima facie compelling motivation for the view is the claim that beliefs Continue reading Against Intellectualist Theories of Belief
The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal-level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. Continue reading What Reasoning Might Be