Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

James R. Beebe and Jake Monaghan (University at Buffalo)

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1. Introduction

Epistemic closure principles have figured prominently in contemporary epistemology, particularly in discussions of radical skepticism. The most commonly discussed skeptical challenges in recent decades employ skeptical hypotheses that depict situations that are subjectively indistinguishable from what we take our normal circumstances to be but in which we fail to have knowledge. Where ‘p’ is some proposition we ordinarily take ourselves to know and ‘SK’ is a skeptical hypothesis, these challenges are typically represented as arguments of the following form:

(1.1) If I know that p, then I know that not-SK.

(1.2) I do not know that not-SK.

(1.3) Therefore, Continue reading Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology